首先，Glide OS是一款在线操作系统。俗称WebOS。免费用户可以享受到30GB、6用户的云存储空间。对，你没看错。不是3G，是30G。当然，如果你嫌空间少，或者你钱多，你可以成为付费用户。当然，空间也将增至250GB、25用户。

好吧，这都不重要，重要的是，Glide OS能为我们提供什么功能？

首先，作为一款在线操作系统而言，应该有个操作系统的样子。用我们的帐户登陆Glide瞧瞧吧。

飞速的载入之后，你看到的是你的桌面。Glide的云端桌面是基于Flash技术构建，界面外观，操作体验良好。桌面上已经布满了Glide的各种功能图标，看起来还是挺强大的。如果你的电脑配置足够高，并且有较大的屏幕分辨率，那么用起来会感觉跟本地电脑操作差别不大。

如果你觉得桌面看起来不够顺眼，你可以自定义桌面，替换掉官方桌面外观：

在桌面上的第一个图标，就是开头提到的30G云存储空间——GDrive，这可以为你远程存储各种数据：图片，音乐，视频，文档，书签……随便啦。总之，它就是用它来管理你操作系统里的文件柜。

有的图片你点击以后，会新开一个浏览器窗口，便于你操作。比如Write图标。这是一个文字处理工具。试试看，比Word差不了多少了。如果你不是Word的骨灰级用户，相信它可以为你承担日常的文字处理工作。

接下来，你可以体验一下Glide桌面上，为你提供的图片处理、日历、邮件客户端等功能。因为Glide主要面向办公用户。同样，Glide也提供了群组功能、会议功能、还有一个效果很炫的3D社会化媒体功能。

甚至，Glide还提供了网页制作的功能。当然，这不同于网页制作软件，它是一个傻瓜式的页面生成工具，类似于QQ空间，只是不强调娱乐性。

上面这一堆，只是Glide的桌面。Glide系统中有一个专门的标签页：Glide HD。它就像Windows里的资源管理器，管理着你整个系统里的资源。

这里面还包含了一个RSS订阅器，效果也是非常夺目：

Glide桌面的下方，有一个Dock条，类似于MAC系统的DOCK功能。也有点像Windows的任务栏。这里集成了一些常用的功能。有画图板：

还有地址本、便签、计算器等功能。

除了上述这些，Glide还非常周到的提供了跨平台的同步功能。如果你经常需要带文件回家加班处理，你可用得着了。Glide提供针对各种提供系统的同步客户端下载，在不同的电脑和不同的操作系统之间便捷地同步文件。别忘了手机。现在的手机功能越来越强大，所以我们经常会需要将文件同步到手机上。所以，Glide还推出了手机版，用手机浏览器可以直接访问Glide，你看到的就像是一个缩小的Glide桌面。

Glide的工程师正在开发HTML5的版本，在不久的将来Glide就能支持iPad了。

还需要多介绍吗？马上来体验Glide的强大威力吧！

点击进入：Glide桌面

点击进入：Glide手机版

在这还有一个功能就是可以同步sycn那么你需要安装软件了.在这里介绍一下在linux下面安装软件.

debian上安装

#apt-get install alien

Available Options for alien

#alien -d package-name.rpm

#alien -i package-name.rpm(同上)

查看看版本

#alien -k rpm-package-file.rpm

例子

把 convert .rpm 转换为 debian 包

#alien -k avg71lms-r30-a0782.i386.rpm

To install .deb file

#dpkg -i avg71lms-r30-a0782.i386.deb

alien安装在 Ubuntu

$sudo apt-get install alien

举例

把 convert .rpm 转换 debian包

$sudo alien -k avg71lms-r30-a0782.i386.rpm

那么你现在就有 avg71lms-r30-a0782.i386.deb 文档

安装 .deb 包

$sudo dpkg -i avg71lms-r30-a0782.i386.deb

来自:http://www.xtit.net/post/Glide-OS/

这是一个为消费者免费服务。如果您的帐户相关的设备与北京谱仪，它不会为你工作。 黑莓 BES的保护已经有许多功能对那些提供。完整的功能列表如下：

• 在地图上找到
• 激活响亮铃声
• 装置锁定
• 密码更改
• 失物招领屏幕
• 远程擦除设备和microSD卡都
• OTA的PIM数据备份，书签和文本信息

有两个接口：设备应用程序和基于Web的控制面板使用浏览器访问。

的特点是相当不言自明。如果您有您的设备丢失或放错地方，首先你应该做的是设置一个密码（如果你没有设置一个尚未）和锁定装置。

然后你可以尝试在地图上的工具，它使用全球定位系统来找到您的设备并显示在地图上找到它。当然，你用GPS覆盖面有限：如果您的设备在建筑物内，你将无法找到它。但是，一个很好的特性是能够显示其最后为人所知的位置，这可能派上用场。

另一个凉快的特点是失物招领屏幕。它改变了锁屏信息和改变其背景颜色为红色。因此，如果有人有你的设备，他们可以阅读您的邮件与您联系相应。

如果你知道你的设备是附近某处，但根本无法找到它，你可以激活大声林格。这使您的手机响响亮的声音：通过铃声配置方式（）。

最后，如果您决定要消灭或者出于安全原因，或任何其他设备，您可以发出一个远程擦除命令和删除上的所有设备和存储卡的数据。所有这些功能通过Web界面提供反馈，所以你知道，如果一擦操作成功与否。而且，如果你没有备份你的设备最近，你可以先运行备份，然后擦拭。

还提供了是你（日历，联系人，便笺和任务）和您的书签和文本消息的OTA备份PIM数据。这是在云所有！你可以安排自动备份或手动启动的。可能的时间间隔是每天，每周，每月。你可以选择备份所有可能的选择项目或自定义您的需求。此规则同样适用于恢复。如果你有有限的数据，您可以设置它通过Wi – Fi只备份。同样，它不会运行备份，而在默认情况下漫游，但是你可以激活，如果你想要的。

如果你需要恢复你的数据，您可以选择从备份集列表。

整个帐户管理是基于即将推出的黑莓ID系统，这也为2.0使用AppWorld。用户将拥有所有的产品，支持黑莓编号单一登录。而每黑莓保护帐户可以与多达5黑莓设备 。

目前，黑莓保护正在运行在一个封闭的测试计划。一个公开测试方案应可在未来几个月内。目前，支持的设备清单：

• 黑莓Storm 9500 5.0 OS软件
• 黑莓风暴9530 5.0 OS软件
• 黑莓Storm2 9550 5.0 OS软件
• 黑莓Bold 9000 5.0 OS软件
• 黑莓Bold 9700 5.0 OS软件
• 黑莓9630同游4.7.1或5.0操作系统软件
• 黑莓8520 5.0 OS软件
• 黑莓Curve 8900 4.6.1或5.0操作系统与软件

从我们所听到的，最终所有4.6操作系统或更高版本的设备将得到支持。

黑莓网站需要保护这些浏览器的任何一个：

• 视窗®的Internet Explorer ® 7或8
• Mozilla的火狐® ® 3超
• Safari的3或4

我高兴地看到在运动的研究终于为消费者提供一些备份和保护他们的数据。这当然增加了许多价值的黑莓品牌。

警告：我们的一位编辑在他的测试发现陷阱一烦了。如果一个设备有否计划已在北京谱仪，不管它是目前连接到一个或没有，用户将必须执行完整的系统恢复。阿安全擦除将无法工作。若要删除了它留下的政策，他们需要闪光，并重新加载操作系统。提防这个问题如果你提供了一个机会参加封闭测试计划，测试计划时或去公众。此外，当我们的编辑采取了媒体卡出来的保护与黑莓BlackBerry设备，用另一种黑莓它，它说，有卡上的内容的限制，而且应该放在原始设备回来。这迫使他用保护装置将文件传输到自己的电脑，担心该设备可能会发现，北京谱仪将踢和禁用保护。我们仍然不知道是否有任何保护与限制，如何利用媒体卡。我不能复制在我结束媒体卡的问题。

Funambol 是世界领先的开源云同步和PUSHMAIL工具，支持诸多手提移动设备，包括苹果、黑莓、Android、Windows Mobile、索爱、三星、诺基亚等20余款（更多）。目前免费用户提供了90天试用版（90 days demo）。

在数据安全得到空前重视、同步软件层出不穷的今天，选择一款背景实力雄厚（诸多开源开发者和项目支持团队）、支持特性丰富、解决方案完善并且知名国际的同步工具是每个同步控的不二标准。可以说，在这点上 Funambol 丝毫不输 Google Sync，值得一试。

这里以我的 BlackBerry 8700g 为例，介绍一下获取和配置 Funambol 的过程：

1、首先登陆 Funambol 的官方网站：http://www.funambol.com （如图）

该网站详尽地提供了各个主要功能和系统介绍的入口，英文过关的朋友可以自如地寻找自己需要的资源。

2、确认设备。点击 Services & Support （设备与支持） 链接，在右上角选择 Service Providers（设备提供商）图标，在该页面选择你的设备。或是直接点击这里进入手持移动设备的品牌选择。我选择 BlackBerry，进入机型选择页面。确认Funambol 支持的设备包括 8700g（如图）。

3、注册用户。在 myFunambol（类似于Web端的Funambol管理后台）注册一个用户账号，并选择您的设备。注意该页面不支持IE6，使用IE6查看时会有警告提示。

4、下载程序。当上述注册填写完成后，Funambol 会向您的手机发送一套短信，提供手机客户端地址链接。这里我直接将发送到我手机的黑莓用客户端地址贡献给BBer：http://my.funambol.com/bb/sync.jad 。JAD格式，黑莓下载后直接安装即可。PC端用黑莓桌面管理器安装。

5、进入程序。安装完后会在黑莓上看到 Funambol 的软件图标出现（如图，阴天室内拍摄效果见谅）。

Enter后的主画面是这样：

6、进入 Settings（设置），设置您的用户名和密码。选择 Sync All （全部同步），或是在 Contacts（联系人）、Calendar（日历）、Tasks（任务）、Notes（便签）中单独同步项目，即可。

至此安装设置和使用 Funambol 进行同步的工作完成。您可以登录 myFunambol 管理后台对账户进行各项管理工作，如图：

一个新的桌面管理器.6.0 但这只是一个传闻.真的下载还不知道在那里呢.不过有这个图.可以说明之已出来了.相信不用多久就可以面世.供大家所使用.

有什么区别？ 乍看之下，决定RIM公司桌面管理器版本为苹果电脑的视觉吸引力，在这种精神，他的对手的PC – munity。 它是好还是坏 – 再评估将根据自己的口味。 我们不知道，不幸的是，将推出的非常实用的重大变化，因为有趣的故事画面，这是我们，可以只在内存设备主屏幕上显示记录，当前版本oprogramowania wraz建议的更新，它的版本。 如管理能力没有任何额外的程序将是相当不错的通讯录和日历，但很可能不是什么期望…

由于我们将能够享受新的桌面管理器，一切都将发出’约’？ 我们不能说什么（因为我可能不会），但我们可以向你们保证，90％可以安全地去度假，不要带笔记本电脑 

Go Daddy是一家提供域名注册和互联网主机服务的美国公司，是目前全球最大的域名注册商。Go Daddy同时提供独立IP，SSL证书，帮助客户打造自己的电子商务网站。估计有很多职业站长都在国外购买的域名，如果你在Go Daddy购买了域名并且正在使用黑莓手机，那么GDBlackBerry将极大的方便你的域名管理。

GDBlackBerry允许用户直接在黑莓上管理自己的域名，当然前提是Go Daddy的用户，用户可搜索和注册域名，管理当前域名，访问Mobile Mail，管理电子邮件和主机选项等等。

由于官方没有详细的介绍，暂时不清楚这款软件的支持系统和机型，但在CrackBerry的测试中，GDBlackBerry可以运行在9700和96系列手机上。

• OTA下载GDBlackBerry（由于未确定支持机型，暂时不提供本地下载）

本文严格遵守《中国莓网站文章更新及信息采集制度》，如侵犯到您的权益，请直接发送邮件至网络相关人员。如需转载请注明出处，感谢您的支持。

1.Google Maps   相信很多人都有用过吧.这个就不用多说了吧.

m.google.com/maps

2. Xplayer   这是个音乐播放器.

wap.shapeservices.com/blackberry/xplayer.php

3. Opera Mini  哈.是一个很不错的浏览器了.可以翻墙哦.

mini.opera.com/

4. BBWeather   这是一个天气预报软件.很不错.也可以跟着图的变化而变化.

bbweather.en.softonic.com/blackberry/download

5. Google Mobile Search     google现在也支持语音搜索的.所以说也特别不错.可惜只能在有wifi的支持下才可以使用.

googlesystem.blogspot.com/2007/03/new-google-mobile-search.html

6. Facebook For Blackberry  这个就不用我多说了吧.好像国内的人很少用.

www.blackberry.com/facebook

7. BBLight  这个就是灯效果.有七彩色的灯光很好看.

software/download/BBLight.jad?q=php” target=”_blank”>www.tateu.net/software/download/BBLight.jad?q=php

8. WorldMate For Blackberry Devices

mobimate.vo.llnwd.net/o23/OTA/WML/3.0/v33/public/48×32/worldmatelive.jad

9. Open Office For Blackberry

forum/viewtopic.php?f=5&t=16143″ target=”_blank”>user.services.openoffice.org/en/forum/viewtopic.php?f=5&t=16143

10. Cellfire

cfx.cellfire.com/wap4?app=Cellfirewap&entry=start&info2=aax&info3=496%2C4%2C444%2C545

如果你很需要的话可以进入去看看.这些会对你有帮助的.

黑莓开发学习（入门教程）01-前言

 黑莓开发学习（入门教程）02-开发环境搭建

黑莓开发学习（入门教程）03-经典的HelloWorld程序

黑莓开发学习（入门教程）04-标准界面的HelloWorld程序

黑莓开发学习（入门教程）05-再说开发环境和入门阶段的一些问题

The year is 1999. Bill Clinton is the President of the United States, gas is 94 cents a gallon, Bondi Blue iMacs are a staple in dorm rooms across the country, and Microsoft is trying to bring the desktop Windows experience to the pocket, pushing its Palm-size PC concept (after Palm had quashed the original “Palm PC” branding) on a world still feeling jilted by the failures of the Apple Newton. 3Com subsidiary Palm and its heavyweight licensee Handspring have figured out something interesting about the still-nascent PDA market, though: people like simplicity. If an electronic organizer does what it says it’s going to do, keeps your information in sync with your PC, runs for forever and a day on a single set of batteries, and does it all with a minimum of fuss, people will buy. It’s an exciting, challenging, and rapidly-changing era in the mobile business.

It’s the network, stupid

This is the landscape Canadian start-up Research In Motion faced at the tail end of the millennium. It seemed clear that “staying connected on the road” was the Next Big Thing — email had finally started to become a standard in corporate communication, after all — but the roadblocks were many and formidable. “Always on” cellular technologies like GPRS and 1xRTT weren’t yet readily available, and circuit-switched data running over pervasive D-AMPS and CDMA networks was painfully slow and expensive — not to mention a death wish for battery life.

Manufacturers and service providers took a two-pronged approach to overcoming the limitations: one, keep data consumption modest; and two, bypass the traditional cellphone networks altogether. Two-way paging networks like ReFLEX didn’t have the bandwidth to handle the data demands of a late 1990s-era PDA with a big display, but DataTAC and Mobitex networks — running at a blistering 19.2Kbps and 8Kbps, respectively — were already widely deployed across North America. Neither technology had been conceived with consumer use in mind, but they were robust, proven, and most importantly, available.

Palm takes a leap of faith — and falls flat

Riding a wave of commercial successes, Palm saw the writing on the wall and plunged head-first into the connected market with its Palm VII, which used a Mobitex-based service called Palm.net to offer bite-sized chunks of relevant data — news headlines, weather, email, flight times, and the like — on a device that resembled an overgrown Palm III with a flip-up antenna. The product was troubled from the start. Though Palm.net’s heart-stoppingly expensive monthly pricing wasn’t necessarily an issue for the business-minded target audience, the device relied on proprietary “web clippings” from content providers to reduce data consumption; if your favorite newspaper didn’t work with Palm to develop a web clipping app, you were stuck using the shoddy WAP browser. What’s more, despite its whopping $599 sticker price, it failed to borrow from the high-end Palm V’s legendary industrial design. Palm hobbled along with two more Palm.net-compatible models, the VIIx and i705, before the GSM-based Tungsten W along with Treos obtained through its acquisition of Handspring overshadowed the dedicated network and doomed it to closure in 2004.

The BlackBerrys aren’t ripe yet in Waterloo

Palm, of course, didn’t need the Palm VII to succeed. The company would go on to see plenty of success from its traditional PDA business and — eventually, anyway — the Treo smartphones it was able to add to the line through its acquisition of Handspring. Meanwhile, the always-on, always-connected market was still waiting to be won, and RIM was perfectly positioned to take the prize. It had been making Mobitex radio modules for industrial systems for many years, and in 1995 had introduced its Inter@ctive Pager 900 — a fairly revolutionary product that promised two-way email communication from a device small enough to fit on a belt holster. The technology was there — RIM merely had to wait for email to become business-critical while working on making its hardware smaller, sexier, and ultimately, indispensable to anyone who picked it up.

In 1998, the Inter@ctive Pager 900 — a bulky brick with a flip-top display — was succeeded by the smaller Inter@ctive Pager 950. As its name implied, RIM considered the 900 and 950 pagers first, emailing devices second; paging was still a force to be reckoned with in the mid-90s (SMS was yet to become relevant in North America) and the company needed to identify with the paging crowd in order to find an audience. Indeed, RIM’s own press release for the 950 proudly declared the device a “revolutionary two-way pager that allows users to both send and receive full-length, error-free, alphanumeric messages with guaranteed delivery.”

The 950 retailed for $360 with plans starting at $25 a month through BellSouth, one of several companies that would ultimately become Cingular (and eventually AT&T Mobility, though Cingular’s Mobitex network — Cingular Interactive — would be sold off prior to the name change). That pricing put the device well within the reach of any company who needed its employees a page (or an email) away. RIM estimated that some 80 percent of pages required a response — and at a time when one-way pagers still dominated the belts of field techs, executives, and doctors, the 950 was priced right to steal some of that market. Even better, the 950 was barely larger than those one-way devices it sought to displace.

A legendary brand emerges

In early 1999, RIM was in fat city. It was coming off a record quarter of earnings thanks to brisk sales of its handhelds and new contracts for its wireless modems, but it wasn’t standing still. On January 19 of that year, the company made a bold declaration: email’s the future. The Inter@ctive Pager devices were excellent two-way pagers, yes, but that wasn’t where the market was going — and RIM knew that it already had a powerful framework for mobile email in play. It introduced a tight little solution called “BlackBerry,” which essentially bundled a version of its Inter@ctive Pager 950 with a PC dock, a new service for synchronizing to Microsoft Exchange accounts, and optionally, a product called BlackBerry Enterprise Server geared at corporations looking to manage fleets of these devices.

Unlike the Palm VII, BlackBerry didn’t try to be fancy — no “web clippings,” no huge touchscreen, no handwriting recognition, and no massive flip-up antenna. Instead, RIM’s device was almost singly focused on delivering a killer email experience with a scroll wheel, relatively comfortable QWERTY keyboard, and true push service (something many other platforms are still trying to get right ten years later, interestingly). For suits who’d been sucked into the Exchange ecosystem for corporate email, BlackBerry was a brave new world — a chance to untether — and they came calling in droves.

And that was just the first couple months of the year. Later in 1999, RIM would release the Inter@ctive Pager 850, which expanded BlackBerry’s North American footprint by bringing the technology to DataTAC networks in the US and Canada (battery life dropped from the 950′s claimed three weeks to just one week, but the 850′s support for rechargeable NiMH packs made it a bit more palatable). Shortly thereafter, the company announced that it would adopt Sun’s Java 2 Micro Edition platform for third-party development in its devices, and — for better or worse — BlackBerry developers write in Java to this day.

A form factor more familiar

By 2000, BlackBerry had cemented itself as a power brand — a corporate status symbol. Paging was on the way out, and RIM had somehow expertly ridden the wave right into mobile email as though that had been its plan all along. Thing is, the display on the 850 and 950 models — a carry-over from the Inter@ctive Pager days — wasn’t particularly well-suited for reading emails, which tended to be longer and richer than old-school pages. The solution? A much, much larger display.

RIM introduced the BlackBerry 957 in concert with BlackBerry OS 2.0 in April of 2000. It would prove to be a landmark device for RIM, though it may not have seemed that way at the time. At its release, it was little more than an overgrown 950, but unlike its little brother, the 957′s basic form factor would ultimately stand the test of time — and if you let your eyes go out of focus just a bit, you can actually see the beginnings of the ubiquitous user interface found on every BlackBerry sold today.

At this point, carriers and content partners were really starting to get it: to borrow a phrase from a 2000 press release detailing a new partnership with Nortel, RIM was becoming a champion of the “always on, always connected” internet, and everyone wanted in on the mojo (Nortel had just invested $25 million in RIM; ironically, RIM would try to buy a large chunk of Nortel’s bankrupt remains just nine years later). Rogers (then Rogers AT&T), Bell Mobility, and BT were among the heavyweight networks to welcome BlackBerry to their lineups. AOL created a version of AOL Instant Messenger for the platform, and RIM started bundling its first web browser with the 950 and 957, though using it ran a stiff $9.95 a month — for 25KB. Yes, twenty-five whopping kilobytes! Fortunately, unlimited service was available for another $10, although it’s amusing to think that wireless data devices were ever rudimentary enough, mobile content services simple enough, and networks slow enough to justify a service that allotted just a few thousand bytes every month.

Conquering the organizer

Today, cloud computing is a fact of life; if you use Gmail, Facebook, Flickr, or any of their contemporaries, much of what makes you who you are is stored in some nebulously-defined network of servers you’ll never see — computers that look like overgrown refrigerators, sound like jet engines, and live in cold, windowless facilities close to power plants and jaw-droppingly fast internet connections. In 2001, the cloud as we know it today was just an idea on a whiteboard (and no one was calling it “the cloud”) but BlackBerry customers were starting to taste bits and pieces of the experience.

RIM used CTIA Wireless in Vegas that year as the venue to introduce the next iteration of its connected experience: wireless calendar synchronization. Up until this point, the BlackBerry platform had been about email first, everything else second (and really, you could argue that’s still the code RIM lives by today), but the company was starting to acknowledge that a businessperson’s mobile office was about more than messaging — and it’s not always convenient to pop open the laptop to check the day’s schedule. Besides, while RIM was making wireless data a mainstream concept in the pocket, laptop data cards were still exceedingly rare. Of course, your average Joe off the street still couldn’t walk into their carrier’s shop, buy a BlackBerry, and get their personal Outlook calendar delivered over the aether — but for corporate customers with Exchange and BES installations, things were really getting interesting.

Pushing “push”

BlackBerry didn’t just commoditize mobile email or connected organization — it helped pioneer the very concept of “push.” Push continues to be an elusive, contentious technology for users of many systems, devices, and mobile platforms to this day — the idea that you get new content pushed to you as it happens, rather than waiting until you request it — but RIM was well ahead of the game here, touting its push technology by name as early as 2001. If someone shot you an email, you had it immediately. Meeting requests zipped down to you the second they were made. Of course, push would ultimately go on to become one of BlackBerry’s hallmarks and one of the major reasons users continue to cite for steadfastly refusing to try other platforms, no matter how outdated RIM’s well-worn interface may now seem by modern standards — it’s a really powerful selling point.

2001 marked a number of important new partnerships for RIM, too, including VoiceStream (which would ultimately become T-Mobile USA) and Italy’s TIM. Maybe more interesting, though, was an announcement the company made at the very tail end of the year: it’d be developing a device compatible with Motorola’s iDEN network technology in partnership with Nextel. iDEN’s claim to fame, of course, was (and still is) its push-to-talk interface — so did this mean that a hybrid BlackBerry cellphone was in the works? Smartphones were still a novelty at the time and heavyweights like Microsoft hadn’t yet come to play ball, but the synergy was pretty obvious: road warriors do their email and take conference calls from the back of the cab on the way to LAX, after all.

Feeling litigious

For RIM, the decade has been filled with seemingly countless bouts of Law & Order-worthy courtroom drama, a theme that can trace its origins to November of 2001 when IP holding firm NTP — whose mere mention causes knee-jerk grumbles of “patent troll!” in some circles — filed its first lawsuit against the company. The suit focused on technologies surrounding the wireless transmission of email, which… well, kind of sums up RIM’s entire business model, so the spat naturally garnered its fair share of attention. After some four and a half years of legal action, tentative settlements, and breakdowns, RIM and NTP finally came to terms to the tune of $612.5 million — considerably less than the $1 billion NTP had originally wanted, but still a breathtaking sum for a company that had done little more than sit on some purely theoretical technology.

Of course, RIM was sitting on an enviable IP portfolio of its own by this point, and that portfolio was starting to pay dividends right around the time of NTP’s original filing. 2002 saw a licensing agreement take hold with Palm (without which the Treo line’s famously good keyboards would’ve had a hard time existing) and a series of claims filed against upstart rival Good Technology — which at the time was working on a suspiciously BlackBerry-esque device called the G100 to accompany its server-side suite that duplicated much of RIM’s functionality. Good would ultimately go on to abandon the G100 to focus strictly on software and services and undergo a couple takeovers — most recently by well-known patent plaintiff Visto — so the rough-and-tumble hardware biz clearly hadn’t treated them with as much kindness as it had RIM.

Finally, two devices become one

2002 would prove to be a watershed year for the smartphone. Nokia’s Communicator line had been around since the 1990s, but its models were niche devices — bulky beasts that didn’t function very well as phones, PDAs, or computers — and they clearly weren’t the catalyst the industry (and consumers) needed to take the concept mainstream.

Following news late in 2001 that there’d be a BlackBerry coming to Nextel’s iDEN network, a flurry of press releases hit in the first part of ’02 touting that new handhelds with “data and voice services” would be made available on carriers around the world; AT&T in the States and Rogers AT&T in Canada both followed Nextel’s lead in committing to offering them. Nextel’s announcement was especially positive, dropping the bombshell that the companies had signed a “multi-year” agreement to supply iDEN-powered BlackBerrys to the network. Of course, that agreement must’ve worked out pretty well for everyone involved, seeing how the relationship continues to the present day.

Well, at first, it turns out that RIM really wouldn’t be helping mainstream smartphone adoption any more than Nokia had. RIM’s very first voice-enabled BlackBerry handset — the 5810 — debuted on Rogers AT&T in April of 2002 for a stiff CAD $750 (about $715 at today’s conversion rates), looking like nothing more than a 957 with a headset jacked into it.

That’s because it was nothing more than a 957 with a headset jacked into it.

Just as wireless calendar synchronization had taken a back seat to email, RIM was now treating another critically important function — voice — as an afterthought. The all-important messaging experience was as good on the 5810 as it was on any BlackBerry before it, but everything about the glued-on phone functionality screamed “usability nightmare,” from the non-numeric pad digit layout to the handsfree permanently wired into place (well, not permanently, but it may as well have been as long as you wanted to use the device as a phone). Bluetooth and integrated speakerphones were yet to become must-have features in 2002, and you certainly weren’t going to find them here.

The engineers up at RIM headquarters weren’t taking a breather, though — far from it. The early part of the decade was a pretty magical time for wireless, for mobile, and for gadgetry in general; a primordial soup of paradigm-shifting technologies were all rapidly coming to fruition at the same time — everything from cheap, high-quality color LCDs to lithium-ion polymer batteries and broadly-available data networks — and phones from all companies were being developed, announced, and released more rapidly than they ever had been before. Gone were the days of owning a DynaTAC for eight years or a StarTAC for four — useful innovation was simply coming to market too quickly for consumers (or manufacturers) to get comfortable for more than a year or two at a stretch.

Make no mistake, it was a fun (if not terribly expensive) time to be paying attention to the market. Just six months — yes, merely half a year — after launching its first voice-capable BlackBerry, RIM gave the people what they really wanted: the 6800 series, introduced at CTIA in October of 2002. Unlike the awkward 5810, the 6810 and 6820 brought a proper earpiece to the equation, finally consummating the marriage of cellphone and connected organizer in a proper, usable way. Though some of BlackBerry’s most important developments were yet to come, you could argue that this was RIM’s turning point — the single, common ancestor to which every modern BlackBerry can trace its lineage.

Two (or three, or four) can play this game

At this point, the industry’s starting to show some early glimmers of awareness: it turns out that people like having their phone, their email, and their calendar in a single, pocketable device. Go figure! Of course, RIM wasn’t the only company having this revelation in 2002; Palm founder Jeff Hawkins’ pet project, Handspring, was just coming to market around the same time with the first members of its sexy, fully-integrated Treo line.

The first Treos — the 180 and 180g — were forgettable (particularly the 180g, which tragically required Palm’s classic Graffiti handwriting input for text entry), but before the end of the year, the 270 (for GSM networks) and 300 (for CDMA) were both shipping. That’s where things started to get interesting. These suckers had color displays and at least pretended to do a decent job of web browsing using the company’s Blazer app — something RIM couldn’t really claim with the 6800. The 270 and 300 were so interesting, in fact, that they ultimately led directly to the release of the Treo 600 the following year, one of the most significant and influential smartphones ever released (it was so influential, in fact, that its genes still live on today in Palm’s Treo Pro).

Even though RIM had just launched the 6810 and 6820, they were already looking outdated sitting on a table next to Handspring’s (and later palmOne’s) offerings. It didn’t really matter, though; Waterloo’s secret sauce lay as much in its robust server-side capabilities as it did in the hardware itself. What early BlackBerrys lacked in finesse, they made up for in manageability — music to any IT staff’s ears. Palm and Handspring, on the other hand, had both done a better job over the years of straddling the fence between office and home — their devices had already been sold in big-box stores since the 90s, and the Treo seemed like a natural extension of that. Palm, of course, lacked a well-known, enterprise-friendly push email solution; for some, that was a deal breaker, but for others, the Treo’s sex appeal made it the obvious choice.

Indeed, RIM was still years away from hitting its stride with consumers; just like its predecessors, carriers were positioning the 6800 series toward businesspeople alone, but the strategy certainly seemed to be paying dividends. Before 2002 closed out, they’d go on to announce the 6510 for Nextel and the 6850 for Verizon — the company’s first CDMA device. The world had started the year with a selection of zero BlackBerry phones and ended it with five. The revolution had begun, and as it turned out, there was plenty of room in the market for RIM and Palm to both stake their claims — the concept was still young, competition was yet to become fierce, and the target demographic was hungry for innovation. Both companies would go on to hold significant pieces of the pie among business users (particularly in North America) in the latter half of the decade.

Acknowledging the elephant in the room

It wasn’t just Handspring (and later palmOne) with skin in the game, either. Though it had a muted presence in North America, Nokia was jumping out to a commanding lead globally on the strength of its Symbian-based Series 60 platform, a lighter-weight derivative of the Series 80 core used on the Communicator series. By the end of 2003, some estimates had its smartphone market share near a staggering 90 percent worldwide. That’s a stat you can’t ignore, and RIM was eminently aware that it needed to capitalize on its “CrackBerry” reputation — its strength as an enterprise software and services player — and keep its hardware ego in check. Sure, it now had several phones in the market, but so did everyone else — so why try to beat ‘em if you can just join ‘em and still make money?

To that end, early ’03 saw the introduction of BlackBerry Connect on Symbian, bringing BlackBerry’s then-legendary corporate email capabilities to a seemingly limitless firehose of Nokia devices (along with a couple Sony Ericssons) and potentially upping RIM’s profile in the all-important European theater. It also hit Windows Mobile and Palm OS the same year, cementing BlackBerry’s status as a platform, not just a line of devices. The Connect solution would ultimately never gain the same level of popularity as the company’s handsets would for hooking up to BlackBerry servers, but from RIM’s perspective, that’s probably just as well — they saw it as a win-win opportunity, and Nokia, Microsoft, and Palm very likely did as well.

Consumers are people, too

Even in these early years, RIM had already reinvented itself a couple times; gone were the days of “BlackBerry” meaning a small, ugly, all-black pager with all the ergonomics of a VAX that you could only get (and probably were forced to take) through your employer. Thanks likely to the introduction of its range of smartphones in the prior few months, 2003 would be the year that the company started to finally dip its toe in what it called the “prosumer” market — customers that weren’t necessarily being offered a BlackBerry as part of an IT-managed fleet at their company, but still really needed (and were willing to pay for) always-on push email. Cingular, T-Mobile, and others started to introduce POP and IMAP email access on their BlackBerry devices early that year, marking the first time they were viable options for one-off buyers. Paying $30 a month for a mere 3MB of data service on top of a voice plan — as Cingular was doing at the time — was still a foreign concept to 99 percent of the non-enterprise market, but it marked one of the first early steps in acclimating end users to the idea. Today, even for a high-feature dumbphone, $70 is a reasonable charge for monthly service and $120 or more isn’t unheard of — it’s a trade-off we’ve collectively made to be connected all of the time, and RIM helped blaze that wallet-emptying trail.

Small and colorful

RIM continued to press as hard on the hardware front in 2003 as it had in 2002, proving it wouldn’t let its hardware go quietly into the night and transform into a software firm the same way Good would. The new 6200 series took baby steps toward the classic BlackBerry look we all know today by lightening and shrinking the package, squishing the 6800′s display down to a more typical landscape aspect ratio, and making it more functional than ever by stuffing in more RAM and introducing integrated attachment viewing.

Just a few months later, the company would introduce the 7200 series, its very first color models — but they wouldn’t look very familiar to a modern-day Bold owner. Instead, the 7200 was nearly a dead ringer for its lower-end 6200 cousin, swapping out the low-resolution monochrome display for a 65,000-color one that clocked in at just 240 x 160 pixels — brutal by modern standards. The crappy resolution on the new model could be chalked up in part to the fact that the screen was transflective, a sunlight-viewable tech that has been all but abandoned in modern smartphones because they simply don’t pony up sufficient eye candy — these days, you need HVGA or WVGA resolution and killer contrast ratios to earn respect and market share.

The 7250 would also be RIM’s first EV-DO-capable handset, but taken as a whole, the series seemed built less to knock socks off and more simply to appease the market’s calls for a color BlackBerry. In a way, it would mark the beginning of an age of R&D conservatism in Waterloo that plagues the company to this very day.

One million strong (and growing)

The year is 2004. Palm OS would arguably reach its zenith with the introduction of the Treo 650, a model that refined the well-received 600 in all the right ways (and brought about the slightly-curved QWERTY arrangement that most — but not all — future Palms would go on to use). RIM signed up its millionth subscriber early in the year, a sign of great things to come over the next twelve months; the company would be announcing new carrier deals in every corner of the world virtually every week, and the tall-display form factor introduced way back on the data-only 957 would have one last hurrah on the 7700 series. 2004 would also see the first speakerphone-enabled BlackBerry, Nextel’s 7510 for iDEN. As with the 7200, RIM going all-in with groundbreaking design or functionality — both of the new models looked virtually identical to the 6200 of old, not a good thing considering that the 6200 had already looked pretty outdated by the time it was released.

The solution? Completely rethink the keyboard. RIM came out of its slumber and rocked the boat later in ’04 more than it had since the announcement of its first phones by rolling out the 7100 line — along with a little something called “SureType.” Up until that point, each and every BlackBerry that came off the line used a traditional QWERTY thumb board; SureType turned things upside-down by doubling up two letters per key, a compromise between full QWERTY and the T9 / triple-tap world of numeric keypads. Beyond SureType, though, the 7100 was a radically different design for RIM — its first that made concessions to appeal to consumers. It looked and worked vaguely like a phone. Though it hadn’t yet succumbed to the d-pad trend, the 7100 also added dedicated Send and End keys above the keyboard and was marketed directly to consumers in T-Mobile, Cingular, Sprint, and Verizon stores. Put simply, it was a predecessor to the Pearl in every sense of the word — RIM finally had its eye squarely on the consumer side of the market, and it’d end up paying off.

Reinventing the bread and butter

BlackBerry was more popular than ever. In a year and a half, the service exploded from 1 million to over 4 million subscribers, but the time had come: RIM could no longer stretch the industrial design of the 6800 any further than it already had, and in late 2005 it finally took the bold (but totally necessary) step of redesigning its time-tested flagship from the ground up. Waterloo rode the resulting lineup — the 8700 series — to new heights, deploying on dozens of carriers around the world with a theme that mimicked the 7100 that had been unveiled a year prior. There were notable firsts: in North America, it became both the company’s first EDGE-compliant handset and its first with a QVGA display. It was also the first QWERTY BlackBerry with a proper Send / End key arrangement; needless to say, the modern BlackBerry we know today cemented its ancestry right here.

Though it supported EV-DO early on, RIM was much slower in taking up UMTS than most of its rivals, putting it at a distinct spec sheet disadvantage on Cingular in the US and virtually every carrier in Europe (even the 8900 and brand-new 8500 lines stop at EDGE, practically unheard of for a smartphone from a major manufacturer these days). Mercifully, some Europeans got a taste with certain variants of the 8700 that supported UMTS 2100 — but Americans would still have years to wait.

A BlackBerry in every pocket

By 2006, every carrier that offered BlackBerry was more than happy to sell a 7100 or 8700 to Joe Six-Pack, regardless of corporate affiliation. RIM and its partners had done a decent job of making it clear to would-be buyers that you didn’t need to wear a suit, own an Exchange account, or get permission from your IT overlords to purchase, use, and enjoy a BlackBerry of your own. Problem was, RIM had never designed and built a no-compromises consumer device. The 7100 came within earshot, but by 2006, times had changed — you couldn’t put a phone (smart or otherwise) on the shelf without a camera and a handsome design and expect it to sell itself.

That all changed in September of ’06 with the introduction of the 8100 series, a phone we would come to know better as the Pearl. The fact that this was RIM’s first handset christened with a brand name underscored its intended target audience: this was solidly a consumer device. Adopting the SureType input system first seen on the 7100, everything about it screamed its consumer roots from the snazzy color palette to the presence of a 1.3 megapixel camera — a BlackBerry first. It also marked the introduction of the trackball, an utterly unique feature for a phone at the time and the genesis of the “Pearl” name; it was the first time RIM had employed front-facing directional navigation of any kind, in fact, and as it turns out, they wouldn’t look back.

As we know today, the Pearl would become a defining phone for RIM — its own RAZR, in a way, but without the brutal downside than Motorola would go on to experience. Versions of the handset were sold on virtually every carrier in North America and in many locales around the world; some of those are still sold today, including a clamshell version in the 8200 series. The design was so popular, in fact, that RIM took a mid-cycle opportunity to swap out the guts of the original GSM-flavored 8100 to add in a 2 megapixel camera, WiFi, and GPS. In an industry as brutal and fickle as consumer wireless, it takes nothing less than a miracle to create a device with three solid years of market longevity.

Meet the grandkids

Outside the Pearl line, RIM ultimately chose to split the bulk of its business — the traditional QWERTY form factor — into distinct consumer- and pro-oriented series starting with the Curve 8300 and 8800 in early 2007. Over the years, we’ve gone on to witness the release of two more Curves — the 8900 and 8500 — along with three more pro models, spawning the Bold and Tour brands. By the end of 2008, RIM seemed to acknowledge the fuzzy line between its two QWERTY series by giving the original Bold a name, something that had previously been reserved for the more laid-back consumer devices. RIM’s practice of slow-but-steady evolution has now brought us the broad adoption of 3G, dual-mode and WiFi radios, autofocus cameras, gorgeous high-res displays, and robust optical trackpads in place of the finicky trackballs of old, all while pushing the same back-end security, collaboration, and communication benefits that brought them superstar status a decade ago.

As in the early days of the 6800, 6200, and 7200, the company’s once again taking criticism for driving a theme into the ground — one look at the family tree starkly demonstrates how little has changed in nearly three years. The counterargument, of course, is that they’ve settled on a winning formula, refining it year after year without messing with the recipe that made billionaires of co-CEOs Lazaridis and Balsillie. What side of the fence you fall on is very much a matter of personal opinion, but on some level, it says something about one’s personality: it’s a choice between productivity and multimedia, vanilla and chocolate, Ford and Chevy. A BlackBerry can be your music player just as an iPhone can connect to your Exchange account — it’s ultimately a question of priorities, and for some, allegiances.

A gamble on reinvention

Push email in a mobile device isn’t the same kind of massive, paradigm-changing differentiator that it was ten years ago, and RIM can’t lean on it nearly as heavily as it used to for sales — even in its traditional corporate strongholds. It needs powerful, sexy products that can compete head-to-head with any smartphone the industry has to offer. To an extent, it has those with modern QWERTY sets like the Curve 8900 and Bold 9700, but here’s the rub: the consumer market has made a sharp turn toward touch in the two-plus years since the iPhone has been available. It’s a segment that’s not just difficult for competitors to ignore — it’s impossible. Android, S60 5th Edition, and an endless onslaught of mid- to high-end featurephones validate it and make it harder to stay relevant without it. So how does a company with a host of patents regarding QWERTY thumb boards — a company that has built its reputation on the quality of its physical input methods — capitalize on something so foreign to its core competency?

That question remains largely unanswered as we end this first decade of BlackBerry’s colorful existence. The company that taught us we could belt out messages with two thumbs using keys no bigger than eraser heads and made us crave constant email access from the bus, the airport, the bathroom, and the beach finds itself today in need of another revolution.

The good news is that RIM doesn’t roll the dice very often, but when it does, it plays for keeps; the 7100 and the Pearl were both early evidence of that, and we’re now seeing that brazen attitude again with the Storm line. The company’s early forays into touch are taking Waterloo well outside its comfort zone and the first models to market were almost universally panned as usability failures, but it’s not all gloom and doom — like SureType, the Storm’s SurePress technology is unique in the industry, and a little more refinement could probably still make it the virtual keyboard powerhouse RIM wants it to be.

In 2005, RIM had 4 million subscribers to its name; in 2009, it adds over 4 million subscribers in a single quarter. BlackBerry isn’t going anywhere, clearly, but for a company in RIM’s position, relevance is a daily battle that requires a delicate mix of innovation and respect for tradition.

And on that note, RIM, bring on the next ten years — you may have calloused and cramped our thumbs, but you haven’t managed to destroy them just yet.

qwerty键盘：选项-状态-依次输入字符BUYR
qwertZ键盘：选项-状态-依次输入字符BUZR

ST键盘：832211（buyyrr或者buzzrr）

如果是全新机器会出现：
数据使用：0K
语音使用：0分钟（超过60分钟就不计了）

如果是使用过的机器就会出现：（就是说机器已经用过了）

1.如果上了（曾经上过）黑莓服务就显示：
数据使用：IT策略已启用（it policy enabled）
语音使用：IT策略已启用（it policy enabled）

2.如果没上过黑莓服务就会出现
数据使用：XXXK
语音使用：XXX分钟（超过60分钟就不计了）

还为你的BB防火墙头痛吗?还为你的BB状态里看通话时间的看的不爽吗?别急.下载以下软件帮你的BB把防火墙小红锁解掉,解决在状态里看不到通话时间(IT策略已启用)的问题…解好了.给我用力顶贴..
下载以下软件．
it_policy.rar (103 KB) 

使用方法：
使用前请用桌面管理器备份你手机里的资料
然后直接运行该程序就ＯＫ了